On April 30, 2010, John W. Rice (identified in the complaint as "a resident and qualified Republican elector of Lee County who intends to vote in the Republican primary election on June 1, 2010") and Tom Parker (identified in the complaint as "a qualified Republican candidate for re-election to the office of Associate Justice, Alabama Supreme Court, place 3, in the Republican primary election on June 1, 2010") (hereinafter "the petitioners") filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, or other appropriate extraordinary relief in the Montgomery Circuit Court and named as respondents Beth Chapman, as Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, all Alabama probate judges and circuit clerks,
The petitioners contend Secretary of State Chapman improperly certified Johnston as a candidate because Johnston did not comply with Alabama Code 1975, § 17-5-4, requiring prospective candidates to timely file "Appointment of Principal Campaign Committee," and Alabama Code 1975, § 36-25-15, which requires candidates to file "Statement of Economic Interest" forms.
Johnston moved to dismiss the petition, alleging, among other grounds, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners' pre-election claims, citing § 17-16-44,
The parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts that set out the dates on which the actions that led to the filing of the petition occurred:
Following a hearing on May 13, 2010, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered an order on May 17 denying the requested relief on the merits.
On appeal, the petitioners contend that the circuit court erroneously found that Johnston had timely filed the "Statement of Economic Interests" in accordance with the requirements of the Alabama Ethics Act, § 36-25-1 et seq., Alabama Code 1975, and that Johnston had timely filed the form appointing his principal campaign committee. Therefore, the petitioners contend that the circuit court's order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction is based on an incorrect premise. The petitioners also ask this Court to overrule Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1991), as "being inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the [Fair Campaign Practices Act, § 17-5-1 et seq., Alabama Code 1975]."
The respondents argue that the trial court's opinion, though in their view correct on the merits, should not have been entered because, they argue, that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Alabama Code 1975, § 17-16-44. Because the Court holds that the respondents are correct and that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist under the facts of this case, we do not address the merits of the petitioners' claims for relief that are based on the purported failure of Johnston to comply with the Ethics Act or the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
Alabama Code 1975, § 17-16-44, sometimes referred to as the "jurisdiction-stripping statute," severely restricts a court's jurisdiction to hear actions challenging the conduct or results of elections. As noted above, the statute provides:
The petitioners' lawsuit implicates the jurisdiction-stripping statute because it seeks to impact the "conduct" of the June 1, 2010, Republican primary election by having the court either remove the name of one of the candidates, Eric Johnston, from the ballot or instruct the Republican Party not to canvass votes cast for Johnston. Thus, in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over this action, § 17-16-44 requires that there be a statute giving it "authority to do so" which is "specially and specifically enumerated. . . ."
The petitioners have cited as the statutory authority for the court's jurisdiction Alabama Code 1975, § 36-25-15(c). That provision of the Ethics Act provides that "[o]ther provisions of the law not withstanding" if a candidate fails to "submit a statement of economic interests in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, the name of the person shall not appear on the ballot. . . ." The general
Therefore, pursuant to Alabama Code § 17-16-44, the Court holds that there does not exist subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is hereby vacated, and this appeal is dismissed.
ORDER VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
TORBERT, Special Chief Justice, and KENNEDY, HARWOOD, SUTTLE, STEWART, TOMPKINS, and CAPELL, Special Justices, concur.
INGRAM and BAXTER, Special Justices, not sitting.